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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-2106 
 ___________ 
 
 ALMAZ USSENOV, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A088-440-332) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 5, 2012 
Before:  FUENTES, JORDAN AND VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed:  September 6, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Almaz Ussenov, a native of the former USSR and citizen of Kazakhstan, seeks 
review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) opinion denying his application for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT).  The BIA sustained the adverse credibility determination of the immigration 
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judge (IJ), and held, as a result, that Ussenov had failed to meet his burden of proof for 
obtaining relief.  For the following reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Ussenov, who arrived in the United States in March 2010 on a nonimmigrant F-1 
visa, was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) for failing to 
attend the program for which he had been admitted to the United States.  In response, he 
applied for asylum and derivative relief, on account of alleged persecution sustained on 
the basis of nationality, religion, political opinion, and membership in a social group.  
Administrative Record (A.R.) 440.  In a lengthy asylum statement, Ussenov both decried 
the general conditions in Kazakhstan and told the story of his mistreatment in the 
country, focusing on several instances of alleged persecution.  First, in 2002, he was 
allegedly pushed off a train by religious extremists, leading to a year-long period of 
hospitalization.  A.R. 450–52.  After his recovery, he visited a church, as he was 
considering converting from Islam to Christianity.  Upon leaving the church, he was 
assaulted, leading to another period of hospitalization.  A.R. 452–53.  He filed a police 
report, but was beaten yet again.  A.R. 453.  Separately, Ussenov described his fear of his 
brother-in-law, a member of Kazakhstan’s national-security apparatus (described 
variously as equivalent to the FBI or KGB) who assaulted him after a domestic dispute 
and killed his father, a murder covered up in the official records.  A.R. 454–55.  This 
incident led to his wife’s divorcing him and taking away their son.  A.R. 455.  Ussenov 
worried that, were he to return to Kazakhstan, he would be targeted by people who 
“desire [his] death and could do it with ease.”  A.R. 456. 
 After several continuances, Ussenov appeared pro se before an IJ in January 2011.  
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His testimony (which was conducted through a translator) was, at times, difficult to 
follow; Ussenov appeared confused regarding the chronology of the numerous assaults 
and hospitalizations, and testified about incidents that he had not included in his 
statement.  At several times during the proceedings, the IJ appeared to become 
exasperated with Ussenov’s shifting answers.  Ultimately, the IJ denied his application.  
She found that Ussenov had not testified credibly, which doomed his application, see
On appeal before the BIA, and now represented by counsel, Ussenov assailed, 
inter alia, the IJ’s demeanor during his hearing and the bases of her adverse credibility 
determination.  The appeal was dismissed, and while the BIA acknowledged some errors 
in the adverse credibility determination, it held that it was not so infirm as to be clearly 
erroneous.  A.R. 3.  Thus, because Ussenov had not testified credibly, and because the 
IJ’s behavior did not amount to the denial of a fair hearing, Ussenov had not met his 
burden for relief.  A.R. 4.  Ussenov filed a timely, counseled petition for review. 
 
A.R. 79; in the alternative, even if Ussenov had testified credibly, she concluded that he 
would not have satisfied the burdens of proof necessary for asylum, withholding, or CAT 
relief.  A.R. 80–90.   
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review the BIA’s final order of 
removal.  See Borrome v. Att’y Gen., No. 11-1975, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 2914111, at 
*2 (3d Cir. July 18, 2012).  Factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, 
are reviewed under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard.  See Yusupov v. Att’y 
Gen., 650 F.3d 968, 989 (3d Cir. 2011).  A credibility finding must be upheld on review 
unless any reasonable adjudicator, finding that it is not supported by “reasonable, 
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substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole,” would be 
compelled to reverse it.  Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citations, quotations omitted).  Because Ussenov filed his asylum application after May 
2005, the REAL ID Act standards governing credibility determinations apply.  See 
Yusupov, 650 F.3d at 991 n.34.  Under REAL ID, the trier of fact may base her 
credibility determination on a variety of factors, without regard to whether any 
inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood implicates the heart of the claim for relief.  8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(iii).  “An alien’s credibility, by itself, may satisfy his burden, or 
doom his claim.”  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also 
Hassan v. Holder
As a preliminary matter, we agree with the Government that the BIA did not 
“expressly adopt or defer to” the IJ’s alternative holding denying Ussenov relief even if 
he were deemed credible.  
, 571 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 2009). 
See Br. for Respondent 33 n.4.  As we read the BIA’s 
decision, it affirmed, with modifications, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, and 
held that because Ussenov was not credible, he had failed to meet his burden of proof.  
Under this construction, because the BIA did not defer to the IJ’s decision, we have 
jurisdiction to review its opinion only.  See Nelson v. Att’y Gen.
However, having carefully considered the evidentiary record compiled in this case, 
we conclude that the BIA’s adverse credibility determination finds substantial support in 
, 685 F.3d 318, 320–21 
(3d Cir. 2012).  Consequently, were we to hold that the credibility determination was not 
supported by substantial evidence, we would remand to the BIA for consideration of the 
IJ’s alternative conclusion. 
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the record, and must therefore be upheld.  The BIA pointed out that Ussenov’s testimony 
regarding police reports varied from his written statement, and declined to credit his 
alternative explanation that “police reports” were synonymous with letters to the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs.  A.R. 3.  More broadly, the BIA was troubled by Ussenov’s assertions 
that there were many additional violent incidents, several of which led to hospitalization, 
that were not laid out in his asylum application.  We agree that he did not adequately 
show that the many injuries he received affected his memory to the point where this 
discrepancy would be satisfactorily addressed.  In sum, while we have certainly seen 
adverse credibility determinations based on sounder (and broader) foundations, we 
cannot conclude that the BIA’s decision was so unsupported as to be reversible.  
Ussenov argues, in the alternative, that the IJ’s conduct, which he describes as 
“unprofessional and improper,” had the net effect of denying him a fair hearing and 
undermining her adverse credibility determination.  Ussenov cites three primary 
incidents: the first, an exchange regarding the admissibility of X-rays; the second, an 
“irrational” exertion of pressure in the aim of getting him to assent to the veracity of the 
materials in his asylum application; and the third, a moment where the IJ appeared to 
“rebuke” Ussanov for smiling.1  We agree with the BIA that Ussenov has failed to show 
prejudice flowing from these incidents, a necessary component of a due-process 
violation.  See Delgado-Sobalvarro v. Att’y Gen.
                                                 
1 A fourth area of contention, involving the IJ’s failure to acknowledge Ussenov’s 
complaints about documents being lost by the management of the detention center, was 
not raised below and is hence unexhausted and unreviewable.  See Castro v. Att’y Gen., 
671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).  
, 625 F.3d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 2010).  
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Furthermore, while the exchanges evince a certain impatience, they do not rise to the 
belligerence, browbeating, and finger-on-the-scale phenomena described by this Court in 
cases such as Cham v. Attorney General, 445 F.3d 683 (3d Cir. 2006), and Wang v. Att’y 
Gen.
In sum, because we conclude that the adverse credibility determination was 
supported by substantial evidence, we are in agreement with the BIA that Ussenov failed 
to meet his burden of demonstrating entitlement to asylum or the stricter standard for 
showing that he should be granted withholding of removal; nor, for that matter, are his 
evidentiary submissions alone sufficient to show that he would more likely than not be 
“tortured” if returned to Kazakhstan.  
, 423 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005). 
See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen.
  
, 663 F.3d 
582, 590–91 (3d Cir. 2011) (setting out the tests for relief under all three standards).  
 Accordingly, we will deny this petition for review. 
